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Description
The Eurozone crisis has pushed reform of the European Union (EU) to the  forefront 
of political debate. How can a Union of 28 states with a population of over half 
a billion be reformed to weather future economic crises and political challenges? 
Finding an answer to this question is extremely difficult not only because current 
reform proposals are so varied, but even more so because we lack insights into the 
preferences for reform amongst national elites and  publics. Although EU support 
has interested scholars for over three decades now, we  virtually know nothing 
about public support for EU reform. Current  research  focuses  almost exclusively 
on the causes of support for the current project and fails to provide a sufficient 
basis for effective reform decisions. Surely, the  feasibility and sustainability of 
EU reform crucially hinges on the support amongst  national publics. eupinions 
examines public support for EU reform by developing a theoretical model and 
employing cutting-edge data collection techniques. Our findings will aid policy 
makers to craft EU reform proposals that can secure widespread public support.
EUPINIONS  WHAT DO THE PEOPLE WANT?
Executive Summary
L ast year we published the report Fears Not Values: Public opinion and the populist vote in Europe in which we presented survey evidence suggesting that supporters of populist parties differ from supporters of mainstream parties in one important respect: they fear globalization. 
Here we follow up on these findings and explore in depth people’s knowledge 
and feelings about globalization and how these are linked to their views about 
the future of the European Project. We present evidence based on a survey con-
ducted in July 2017 in which we asked over 10,000 EU citizens in every member 
state about their globalization fears and their opinions about future European 
cooperation. We present two sets of evidence; one is based on a sample captur-
ing public opinion in the EU27, and the other amplifies the picture by focusing 
more in-depth on respondents from the five largest member states in terms of 
population, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. Since our report focuses 
on future European cooperation post-Brexit, we focus on the EU27 only and 
have excluded Great Britain.
• A considerable number of Europeans think globalization is a threat (44 per 
cent EU-wide, with national results varying from 53 per cent in Poland to 
39 per cent in Spain). But when probed about their personal experiences 
with globalization these have overall been more often good than bad (67 
per cent of Europeans consider that globalization has been good or more 
good than bad personally, with results varying from 55 per cent in Spain to 
70 per cent in Poland). The supporters of populist parties are an exception: 
they are both fearful of globalization and have had bad personal experi-
ences with it. (63 per cent of AfD supporters consider globalization a threat 
while 56 per cent say it has been bad or more good than bad for them per-
sonally; 81 per cent of FN supporters see a general threat while 60 per cent 
see a personal disadvantage.)
• Europeans share a common understanding of what they think the globali-
zation process means: they associate it with trade (increased movement of 
products for 19 per cent and money for 17 per cent) and migration (in-
creased movement of people for 17 per cent). This result is quite stable in a 
wide variety of subgroups be they national, socio-economic, political.
• While those who are optimistic about globalization also welcome more Eu-
ropean cooperation (64 per cent), those who fear it hold much more het-
erogeneous views (45 per cent of them are in favor of more political and 
economic integration, but 41 per cent want less of it). Almost half of those 
who fear globalization see European cooperation as part of the solution for 
addressing these fears. Generally speaking, the threat camp is politically 
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more heterogeneous than the opportunity camp. This pattern holds true 
in all member states although in France those frightened by globalization 
tend to favor less integration (53 per cent), while only 34 per cent wish for 
more. In Spain and Italy, the fear camp on the other hand wishes for more 
integration (68 per cent and 56 per cent more respectively, 26 per cent and 
38 per cent less).
• Populist left-wing party supporters think globalization is a threat, but 
want more European cooperation. In fact, in some areas, such as accept-
ance of migrants and protecting the rights of EU migrants, they wish to go 
further than the average EU27 citizen. For populist right-wing party sup-
porters, the EU is seen as part of the problem and fuels their globalization 
fears. They wish to see less European cooperation in future.
• Despite these differences, the vast majority of respondents from the EU27 
agree in one key respect: they want the EU to focus its future efforts on 
the fight against terrorism and the management of migration. Economic 
issues have lost importance in the minds of Europeans. This result is pretty 
constant across a wide variety of subgroups - national, socio-economic, 
and/or political.
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Introduction
L ast year we published the report Fears Not Values: Public opinion and the populist vote in Europe1 in which we presented survey evidence suggesting that supporters of populist parties differ from supporters of mainstream parties in one important respect: they fear globaliza-
tion. Populist party2 supporters are more anxious about their economic position 
and view globalization as a threat. What’s more, they retain a deep scepticism 
towards the ruling elite. What they, especially voters favoring the far right, are 
most concerned about is migration. Interestingly, however, they admit having 
little or no direct contact with migrants in their everyday lives. Fears about glo-
balization and what the process might bring in the future seems a key concern 
for populist party supporters. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below summarize some of the 
key findings of our previous report. 
1  https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/de/publikationen/publikation/did/fear-not-values/. 
2  Note that many different definitions of populism exist in the literature (see Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013 or 
Guiso et al. 2017). In most definitions the mobilization of anti-elitist views is key. 
FIGURE 1.1   Key concerns of extreme right party supporters in nine countries
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FIGURE 1.2 Key concerns of extreme left party supporters in six countries
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INTRODUCTION
While many commentators expected such globalization fears to shift a series 
of electoral contests in a more populist direction, the outcomes of the Dutch, 
French and German elections did not directly echo the electoral success of 
populist messages that had paved the way for Brexit and the election of US 
President Donald Trump. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte fought off the chal-
lenge of the populist right-wing political entrepreneur Geert Wilders, Emma-
nuel Macron beat the far-right presidential candidate Marine Le Pen in France, 
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel was re-elected for a fourth term, even 
though the Alternative for Germany made considerable electoral gains. These 
recent election results together with persistent signs of economic recovery led 
Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker to spell out an optimistic view for 
Europe’s future in his 2017 State of the Union address. He argued that “the wind 
is back in Europe’s sails. Let us make the most of the momentum” by using this 
“window of opportunity.”3
While the outcome of the Brexit vote and the US presidential elections may 
have made many observers of European politics too gloomy, the recent election 
outcomes may have swung them towards over-optimism. Some commentators 
suggest that the populist tide has turned.4 In this report, we wish to urge caution. 
Observers of European politics should not lull themselves into the belief that the 
recent election outcomes somehow suggest that people’s grievances and discon-
tent with the mainstream are a thing of the past. While a window of opportunity 
to shape Europe’s future post-Brexit might exist, national and European elites 
should tread this territory carefully. It cannot simply be politics as usual. 
In this report we explore people’s fears about globalization and how these 
are linked to their views about the future of the European Project. We present 
evidence based on a survey conducted in July 2017 in which we asked over 10,000 
EU citizens about their perception of globalization and their opinions about future 
European cooperation. We present two sets of evidence: one based on a sample 
capturing public opinion in the EU27, and the other completing the picture by 
focusing more in-depth on respondents from the five largest member states in 
terms of population, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. Since our report 
focuses on future European cooperation post-Brexit, we focus on the EU27 only 
and have excluded Great Britain. Specifically, we seek to answer four questions:
• How do people evaluate the process of globalization, and what does it mean to 
them?
• Are people who are fearful of globalization also skeptical about political and  
economic cooperation within the EU?
• What do people who are fearful of globalization want from the EU?
• How do opinions about globalization and political and economic cooperation 
within the EU differ among supporters of mainstream versus supporters of  
populist left- and right-wing political parties?
3  For the full transcript of the speech, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm. 
4  See for example https://www.ft.com/content/b0f45f12-e7c8-11e6-967b-c88452263daf, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lbsbusinessstrategyreview/2017/06/05/french-les-
sons-how-emmanuel-macron-is-turning-the-tide-on-populism/, or http://en.rfi.fr/
france/20170508-macron-win-may-show-populist-tide-turning.
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There are main five takeaways from our data: 
1. A substantial proportion of Europeans think globalization is a threat, but 
when probed about their personal experiences with it they report that 
these have overall been more good than bad. The supporters of populist 
parties are the exception here. They are both fearful of globalization and 
have had bad personal experiences with it.
2. Europeans share a common understanding of what they think the global-
ization process means: they associate globalization with trade (increased 
movement of products and money) and migration (increased movement 
of people).
3. While optimists about globalization also welcome more European cooper-
ation, those who are more fearful hold much more heterogeneous views. 
For some citizens who are fearful of globalization, European cooperation 
is seen as part of the solution for addressing these fears. 
4. Populist left-wing party supporters think globalization is a threat, but 
want more European cooperation. In fact, in some areas, such as accep-
tance of migrants and protecting the rights of EU migrants, they wish to 
go further than the average EU27 citizen. For populist right-wing party 
supporters, the EU is seen as part of the problem and fuels their global-
ization fears. They wish to see less European cooperation in future.
5. Despite these differences, the vast majority of respondents from the EU27 
agree in one key respect: they want the EU to focus its future efforts on 
the fight against terrorism and the management of migration. 
Our report consists of four parts. In the first, we explore people’s fears about 
globalization. What does globalization mean, do people view it as a threat, and 
how do they evaluate its consequences for them personally? Here we explore 
differences across countries and party supporters. In the second part, we examine 
what those who are fearful of globalization think about European integration 
compared to those who are optimistic. Should European cooperation go further 
or should it come to a halt? Again, we touch on differences across countries 
and party supporters. The third part explores what people want from the EU 
in future. What should the EU’s future policy priorities be? Here we explore 
differences between those who fear globalization and those who do not as well 
as across countries and party supporters. In the fourth and final part, we draw 
some conclusions and outline some of the challenges and constraints that elites 
might face when shaping European cooperation in the coming years. 
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In Focus
What do people think 
about globalization?
G etting a clear sense of how people evaluate globalization is not an easy task. This is mainly due to the fact that no established tradition exists. In this report, we rely on people’s responses to a series of different survey questions designed to tap into what globalization 
means to them, and how they evaluate the process. In order to get a sense of 
what ‘globalization’ means to people we rely on the following survey question: 
• The word ‘globalization’ is often used today to describe a world that is increas-
ingly interconnected. If you had to choose from the list below, which best de-
scribes what the word means to you? 
 — The increasing movement of products
— The increasing movement of ideas
— The increasing movement of money
— The increasing movement of jobs
— The increasing movement of people
— The increasing connectedness of culture
— The increasing connectedness of technology 5
• Please pick 3 in order of importance.
Figure 2 below shows the percentage of people who associate ‘globalization’ with 
the increased movement of products, ideas, money, jobs, people or the growing 
connectedness of culture or technology respectively within the EU27. Across the 
EU27 more people associate it with the increasing movement of products than 
with anything else: 19 per cent of respondents. The second equal most important 
association with ‘globalization’ is the movement of money (17 per cent) and 
that of people (17 per cent). Only 10 per cent of respondents associate it with 
the increased movement of jobs. 
5  The order of the answer categories was randomized. 
FIGURE 2 EU27: Meaning of the word globalization. Movement of…
EU-28
19%
Products
17%
Money
17%
People
13%
Technology
13%
Culture
11%
Ideas
10%
Jobs
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Figure 3 explores differences among the five most populous EU member states. In 
all five countries examined, we find that ‘globalization’ is most often associated 
with the increasing movement of products, money and people. In most of these 
countries people associate ‘globalization’ with the movement of goods, with the 
exception of Poland and Italy where ‘globalization’ is equally strongly associated 
with the movement of people.
As mentioned in the introduction, in our previous report Fears Not Values: Public 
opinion and the populist vote in Europe, we have shown that supporters of populist 
parties are particularly worried about globalization. Hence, we next examine if 
supporters of populist and mainstream parties or those who are not close to any 
party differ when it comes to what they think globalization is all about. Here we 
rely on more in-depth surveys conducted in France, Germany, Italy, Poland and 
Spain in which we asked respondents which political party they felt closest to. 
Figures 4.1–4.5 (graphs can be found at www.eupinions.eu/data) display the meaning 
of globalization for party supporters in these five countries.
The numbers suggests that interesting variations exist across different party 
supporters when it comes to meanings of ‘globalization’. For example, supporters 
of the right-wing Republicans (Rep) in France, Forza D’Italia (FI) in Italy or the 
Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland associate the word globalization mostly 
with the increased movement of people. The same holds true for supporters of 
the Social Democratic party (PSOE) in Spain or the Left party (Gauche) in France. 
Moreover, supporters of Liberal parties in Germany and Spain (FDP and Ciudadanos 
or C’s) are most likely to think that the word globalization refers to the increased 
movement of technology or ideas respectively. On the whole, however, party 
supporters and non-partisans mainly associate the word with the movement of 
money and products. Taken together, the results presented in figures 2-4 so far 
suggest that most respondents in the EU27 associate ‘globalization’ with both 
economic interconnectedness as in a focus on products and money (trade) or 
increased movement of people (migration).
Next, we examine how people evaluate globalization. We do so by relying on 
respondents’ answers to two survey questions. One taps into the extent to which 
people think that globalization constitutes a threat or opportunity, while the second 
asks respondents to evaluate how they feel affected by the process as a person.
FIGURE 3 Meaning of the word globalization in the five largest member states. Movement of ...
Products Money People  Technology Culture Ideas Jobs
France
21% 18% 17% 14% 11% 9% 10%
Germany
18% 18% 16% 13% 14% 11% 10%
Italy
18% 16% 17% 13% 12% 12% 12%
Poland
19% 15% 19% 13% 14% 11% 9%
Spain
19% 19% 16% 14% 12% 11% 9%
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• Do you think that globalization is an opportunity or a threat? 
Please select one.
• Globalization is often associated with a global economy that produces cheaper 
consumer goods (fashion, electronics etc.), cheaper services (mobile communica-
tions, flights etc.) and cheaper labor. For you personally, has globalization been:
— bad,
— more bad than good, 
— more good than bad, 
— good.
 
Figure 5 displays the proportion of 
people who feel that globalization con-
stitutes a threat rather than an oppor-
tunity. Within the EU27 most people 
are optimistic about the globalization 
process, with 56 per cent viewing it 
as an opportunity. That said, however, 
44 per cent are fearful, seeing it as a 
threat. The figure also shows that dif-
ferences exist among the five largest 
member states. While a majority of 
German, Italian and Spanish respond-
ents view globalization as an opportu-
nity, 51 and 53 per cent of French and 
Polish respondents respectively think 
it constitutes a threat. 
Do we find differences between 
populist and mainstream party sup-
porters when it comes to fears about 
globalization? Figures 6.1–6.5 (overleaf) suggest that the answer is yes. They 
show the proportion of respondents who think that globalization constitutes 
a threat or opportunity among party supporters and non-partisans in the five 
most populous member states.
These figures show that the proportion of those stating that globalization is 
a threat is most pronounced among supporters of populist right-wing parties. 
For example, 81 per cent of National Front (FN) supporters in France think it a 
threat, as do 63 per cent of Alternative for Germany (AfD), 60 per cent of Law 
and Justice (PiS) supporters in Poland, and 56 per cent of Lega Nord (LN) sup-
porters in Italy. Globalization fears are slightly less pronounced among populist 
left-wing party supporters. While a majority of Podemos supporters in Spain for 
example thinks globalization is an opportunity, 52 and 51 per cent of supporters 
of the Left party (Gauche) in France and in Germany (Linke) respectively think 
it is a threat. Party supporters of mainstream parties on average think that 
globalization constitutes an opportunity. Support is most pronounced among 
supporters of Emmanuel Macron’s party in France (LaREM), the Social Democratic 
party in Italy (PD) and the Popular Party (PP) in Spain, all at over 80 per cent.
The findings presented in figures 5 and 6.1–6.5 suggest that large numbers 
feel threatened by globalization, especially among those who support populist 
FIGURE 5 Do people perceive globalization 
as a threat?
Opportunity Threat
EU27
56% 44%
France
49% 51%
Germany
57% 43%
Italy
57% 43%
Poland
47% 53%
Spain
61% 39%
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right-wing parties. Now, we examine 
how people feel about the personal 
impact of globalization upon them. Re-
spondents could give clearly positive 
or negative responses (globalization 
has been bad/good for me personally) 
or more nuanced ones (globalization 
has been more bad than good /more 
good than bad for me personally). Fig-
ure 7 shows that within the EU27 as 
well as across the five largest mem-
ber states, the largest proportion of 
respondents is mildly positively dis-
posed towards globalization and thinks 
that on average it has been more good 
than bad for them personally: 53 per 
cent of respondents in the EU27. The 
majority of French, German, Pol-
ish and Spanish respondents think 
the same. In Italy, however, views are much more divided: 42 per cent think 
that globalization has been more good than bad for them personally, while 38 
per cent think it has been more bad than good. While considerable numbers 
of Europeans think globalization is a threat, when they are probed about their 
personal experiences they report that these have overall been more good than 
bad. The supporters of populist parties are the exception here. Most are both 
fearful of globalization and report having had bad personal experiences with it. 
FIGURE 6.1 France: Do people perceive 
globalization as a threat? Differences between 
party supporters. Right to left.
Opportunity Threat
FN
19% 81%
LR
58% 42%
MoDem
55% 45%
LaREM
81% 19%
PS
69% 31%
FI
48% 52%
Other Party
44% 56%
No Party
45% 55%
 
FIGURE 6.2 Germany: Do people perceive 
globalization as a threat? Differences between 
party supporters. Right to left.
Opportunity Threat
AfD
37% 63%
CDU/CSU
71% 29%
FDP
60% 40%
SPD
70% 30%
B90/Grüne
73% 27%
Die Linke
49% 51%
Other Party
48% 52%
No Party
48% 52%
 
FIGURE 6.3 Italy: Do people perceive 
globalization as a threat? Differences between 
party supporters. Right to left.
Opportunity Threat
LN
44% 56%
FI
49% 51%
PD
81% 19%
MVCS
49% 51%
Other Party
62% 38%
No Party
56% 44%
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Figures 8.1–8.5 overleaf inspect differences among party supporters in the five 
largest member states. Interestingly, the pattern between populist right- or left-
wing party supporters and mainstream party supporters is much less pronounced 
than was the case for globalization fears. While a clear majority of supporters of 
the populist right think that globalization constitutes a threat, not all of them 
feel that the process has been bad for them personally. The largest proportion 
of Alternative for Germany (AfD) and National Front (FN) supporters state that 
globalization has been more bad than good for them personally (47 per cent) 
while 43 per cent of Lega Nord (LN) supporters do. The largest proportion (48 
percent) of Italian party supporters for whom the personal consequences of 
globalization have been more bad than good identifies with the Five Star Move-
ment (MVCS). On the left, 46 per cent of party supporters of La Gauche think 
globalization has been more bad than 
good, as do 38 per cent of Podemos 
(Podemos) supporters. The majority of 
mainstream party supporters view the 
personal consequences of globalization 
as more good than bad.
Overall, the results thus far suggest 
that the movements of money, prod-
ucts and people are the commonest 
associations that people make with 
‘globalization’. This in turn suggests 
that people’s understanding of glo-
balization dovetails with the academic 
debate about the roots of the current 
backlash against it. This highlights 
both economic reasons and worries 
about migration (see Funke et al. 
2016 and Norris and Inglehart 2016 
FIGURE 6.4 Poland: Do people perceive 
globalization as a threat? Differences between 
party supporters. Right to left.
Opportunity Threat
K‘15
45% 55%
PiS
40% 60%
.Nowo
61% 39%
PO
63% 37%
Other Party
43% 57%
No Party
45% 55%
 
FIGURE 6.5 Spain: Do people perceive 
globalization as a threat? Differences between 
party supporters. Right to left.
Opportunity Threat
PP
82% 18%
C‘s
71% 29%
PSOE
66% 34%
PODEMOS
57% 43%
Other Party
59% 41%
No Party
47% 53%
 
FIGURE 7 Personal experiences of globalization
Good Bad
 More Good Than Bad More Bad Than Good 
EU27
14% 52%  29%
France
50% 33%
Germany
56% 30%
Italy
42% 38%
Poland
56% 27%
Spain
51% 30%
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for example). Interpretations are very 
similar across countries, but do differ 
across party supporters. Although the 
majority of Europeans are on aver-
age more optimistic than pessimistic 
about globalization, albeit mildly so, 
a substantial part of Europe’s popu-
lation is worried about it. These fears 
are most pronounced among populist 
right-wing party supporters, less so 
among populist left-wing party sup-
porters. Supporters of mainstream 
parties view globalization more as an 
opportunity than threat, and feel that 
the process on average has had more 
positive than negative consequences 
for them personally.
FIGURE 8.1 France: Personal experiences 
of globalization amongst party supporters. 
Right to left. 
Good Bad
 More Good Than Bad More Bad Than Good 
FN
35%5  47%
LR
60%11%  27%
MoDem
68%  19%
LaREM
68%14%  17%
PS
62%10%  27%
FI
40%6  46%
Other Party
44%10%  27%
No Party
47%9%  34%
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FIGURE 8.2 Germany: Personal experiences 
of globalization amongst party supporters. 
Right to left. 
Good Bad
 More Good Than Bad More Bad Than Good 
AfD
41%3  47%
CDU/CSU
14% 70%   15%
FDP
24% 57%   18%
SPD
65%11%  21%
B90/Grüne
14% 65%  19%
Die Linke
47%7  36%
Other Party
47%6  42%
No Party
47%7  40%
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FIGURE 8.3 Italy: Personal experiences 
of globalization amongst party supporters. 
Right to left.  
Good Bad
 More Good Than Bad More Bad Than Good 
LN
37%6%  43%
FI
41%13%  35%
PD
59%19%  22%
MVCS
30%10%  48%
Other Party
45%19%  26%
No Party
43%13%  39%
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Are people who fear globalization also  
skeptical about EU integration?
 
Now we examine what those who believe globalization to be a threat versus 
those who view it as an opportunity think about the EU. In figure 9, we pit the 
support for further political and economic integration of those respondents 
who are fearful of globalization against the views of the relative optimists. We 
distinguish respondents according to their answers to the survey question that 
asked them if they think globalization constitutes a threat or opportunity. Then, 
we examine whether those who think globalization is a threat versus an oppor-
tunity want more, less or the same level of political and economic integration 
in Europe. Figure 9 suggests that the relationship between people’s views about 
globalization and their opinions about more political and economic integration in 
Europe is not that straightforward. While 64 per cent of respondents who view 
globalization as an opportunity also wish to see more political and economic 
integration, those who view it as a threat are much more divided: 45 per cent of 
those who are fearful of globalization 
want more integration, while 14 per 
cent want to keep the status quo and 
41 per cent want less integration.
Figure 10 presents similar informa-
tion to that shown in figure 9, but now 
broken down for the five largest mem-
ber states. Interesting national patterns 
seem to emerge. Among French and 
German respondents who think that 
globalization is a threat, the largest 
proportion also wants less political and 
FIGURE 8.5 Spain: Personal experiences 
of globalization amongst party supporters. 
Right to left.  
Good Bad
 More Good Than Bad More Bad Than Good 
PP
65%24%  11% 
C‘s
59%20%  19%
PSOE
61%12%  25%
PODEMOS
37%13%  38%  12%
Other Party
55%9%  30%
No Party
41%12%  40%
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FIGURE 8.4 Poland: Personal experiences 
of globalization amongst party supporters. 
Right to left. 
Good Bad
 More Good Than Bad More Bad Than Good 
K‘15
43%17%  36%
PiS
51%13%  34%
.Nowo
67%18%  13
PO
65%16%    18%
Other Party
55%13%  27%
No Party
57%12%  27%
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FIGURE 9 Globalization views and support for 
European integration
More Integration Less Integration
 Keep Status Quo 
Globalization as an opportunity 
64% 18% 18%
45% 14% 41%
Globalization as a threat
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economic integration within Europe at 
53 and 44 per cent respectively. This 
is not, however, the case for Italian, 
Polish and Spanish respondents. They 
always want to see more political and 
economic integration in Europe re-
gardless of their stances on globaliza-
tion. Support for more integration is 
unsurprisingly still more pronounced 
among those who think globalization 
is an opportunity compared to those 
who are skeptical about it.
How do populist versus main-
stream party supporters view further 
political and economic integration in 
Europe? We know that above all sup-
porters of populist left- and right-wing 
parties are wary of globalization but 
does this also translate into less sup-
port for European integration? Figures 
11.1–11.5 point to some interesting re-
sults. A clear majority (64 percent) of 
National Front (FN) party supporters 
in France wish to see less political and 
economic integration followed by 59 
per cent of Alternative for Germany 
(AfD) party supporters and in Poland 54 
per cent of Kukiz’15 party supporters 
(K’15). Both party supporters and those 
who do not support any party in Italy 
and Spain want more integration. This 
is also the case for most supporters of 
mainstream parties in Germany, France 
and Poland. Interestingly, supporters of 
populist left-wing parties wish to see 
more integration in Europe. 62 and 48 
per cent of party supporters of the Left 
party in Germany (Linke) and France 
(Gauche) respectively wish to see more 
integration, a view shared by as much 
as 75 per cent of Podemos voters.
The findings presented in figures 
9-11 suggest that globalization fears 
do not automatically translate into a 
FIGURE 10 Globalization views and support 
for European integration in five member states 
More Integration Less Integration
 Keep Status Quo
France
Globalization as an opportunity 
59% 23% 18%
34% 13% 53%
Globalization as a threat
Germany
Globalization as an opportunity 
64% 20% 16%
41% 15% 44%
Globalization as a threat
Italy
Globalization as an opportunity 
73% 17%
56% 38%
Globalization as a threat
Poland
Globalization as an opportunity 
58% 22% 20%
44% 23% 33%
Globalization as a threat
Spain
Globalization as an opportunity 
81% 8%
68% 26%
Globalization as a threat
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FIGURE 11.1 France: Support for European 
integration by party supporters. Right to left. 
More Integration Less Integration
 Keep Status Quo
FN
27% 9% 64%
LR
42% 20% 38%
MoDem
50% 27% 23%
LaREM
65% 20% 15%
PS
60% 20% 20%
FI
47% 19% 34%
Other Party
57% 14% 29%
No Party
44% 20% 36%
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more skeptical view about European 
integration. While those who think glo-
balization constitutes an opportunity 
are also strongly back the prospect of 
further integration, those who see it as a threat are much more divided. Further 
examination of the results suggests that this is likely due to a left-right split on 
integration. For supporters of populist left-wing parties more Europe seems to be 
part of the answer to addressing their globalization fears, while for supporters 
of populist right parties the EU is part of the problem. These results lend sup-
port to the notion that the Left and its supporters may speak up against the EU 
but ultimately they wish to see it reformed, whereas many populist right-wing 
parties simply wish to leave the EU altogether (De Vries 2018). 
FIGURE 11.2 Germany: Support for European 
integration by party supporters. Right to left. 
More Integration Less Integration
 Keep Status Quo
AfD
35% 59%
CDU/CSU
63% 22% 15%
FDP
49% 19% 32%
SPD
66% 18% 16%
B90/Grüne
65% 23% 12%
Die Linke
62% 13% 25%
Other Party
46% 16% 38%
No Party
46% 19% 35%
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FIGURE 11.3 Italy: Support for European 
integration by party supporters. Right to left. 
More Integration Less Integration
 Keep Status Quo
LN
48% 42%
FI
59% 34%
PD
80% 12%
MVCS
61% 32%
Other Party
74% 24%
No Party
68%  9% 23%
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FIGURE 11.4 Poland: Support for European 
integration by party supporters. Right to left. 
More Integration Less Integration
 Keep Status Quo
K‘15
26% 20% 54%
PiS
39% 26% 35%
.Nowo
71% 24%
PO
68% 21% 11%
Other Party
53% 13% 34%
No Party
53% 24% 23%
 
5
FIGURE 11.5 Spain: Support for European 
integration by party supporters. Right to left. 
More Integration Less Integration
 Keep Status Quo
PP
79% 17%
C‘s
78% 9% 13%
PSOE
71% 12% 17%
PODEMOS
75% 18%
Other Party
80% 9% 11%
No Party
75% 19%
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WHAT DO PEOPLE THINK ABOUT GLOBALIZATION?
What kind of European cooperation do people  
who fear globalization want in the future?
 
We have seen that globalization fears do not necessarily translate into more op-
position towards European integration but now we wish to examine what those 
who are fearful of globalization and those who are more uncertain want from 
the EU in future. Here we focus on two aspects. We explore people’s views about 
• the tasks the EU should focus on, and 
• the kind of European cooperation respondents think their country should join in.
 
We begin with the first. What tasks do people want the EU to focus on in years 
to come? And how do the preferences of those who fear globalization versus 
those who do not differ on this topic? Table 1 gives the survey evidence on the 
first question:  
 — Fight terrorism
— Manage migration
— Protect citizens’ rights
— Secure peace
— Create growth
— Stop climate change
— Reduce inequality
— Fix Eurozone
— Other
It provides an overview of the proportion of respondents who think that a par-
ticular task should be the EU’s top priority in years to come. It also divides this 
information according to people’s globalization fears. Overall, the largest number 
of EU27 nationals think that the main task ahead is the fight against terrorism 
at 25 per cent, followed by managing migration at 20 percent, and protecting 
citizens’ rights at 17 per cent. Interestingly, this closer look shows up modest 
differences based on people’s globalization fears. Both sets of respondents think 
that the EU should focus on the same three key issues. Interestingly, most EU27 
citizens do not view economic issues, such as growth, inequality and fixing the 
Eurozone, as the most important policy priorities in years to come. Fixing the 
Eurozone is indeed seen overall as the least important future task for the EU, 
with reducing inequality only slightly more so.
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TABLE 1 EU27: Policy priorities for the EU in coming years by globalization fears
What tasks should the EU focus on in the coming years? Most important:
 
EU27 Globalization as  
a threat
Globalization as  
an opportunity
Fight terrorism 25% 25% 25%
Manage migration 20% 19% 20%
Protect citizens’ rights 17% 17% 16%
Secure peace 13% 13% 13%
Create growth 6% 7% 6%
Stop climate change 7% 6% 7%
Reduce inequality 6% 6% 6%
Fix Eurozone 5% 5% 5%
Other 2% 2% 2%
Do we find differences between countries? They do but Figure 12 overleaf shows 
that the overall top three priorities - fight against terrorism, management of 
migration and protecting citizens’ rights - remain pretty much the same. Most 
of the public thinks that the main task for the EU to focus on is the fight against 
terrorism. This is a top concern for as many as 27 per cent of Italian and Polish 
respondents while for others it is securing peace. For example, 17 per cent of 
Polish and 15 per cent of Italian respondents who think globalization constitutes 
an opportunity think the EU should focus mainly on securing peace. Again, only 
very few think that fixing the Eurozone should be the EU’s main task in years 
to come. Overall, these findings suggest that peace and security issues related 
to terrorism are uppermost in the minds of many Europeans regardless of how 
they evaluate the process of globalization. 
What do the different party supporters think the EU’s priorities should 
be in future? Figures 13.1–13.5 (graphs can be found at www.eupinions.eu/data) 
suggest they mainly agree the top priority should be the fight against terrorism. 
The management of migration is on average the second most important policy 
priority. For supporters of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the Liberal party 
in Germany (FDP), the National Front (FN) and Socialist party (PS) in France 
and of Kukiz’15 (K’15) in Poland the management of migration is even seen as 
the top policy priority. 
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Secondly, we examine the type of European cooperation people wish to see in 
future. We use four survey questions to tap into people’s preferences about the 
kind of European cooperation they think their country should contribute to in 
years to come. These include:
• To what extent do you think that [your country] should provide financial aid to 
another EU Member State facing severe economic problems?  
 — Answers from 1 ‘should not provide aid’ to 10 ‘should provide aid’.
• To what extent do you think [your country] should allow people to come and 
live here who are fleeing from political or religious persecution in line with EU 
quotas? 
— Answers from 1 ‘should not allow them in’ to 10 ‘should allow them in’.
• To what extent do you think that [your country] should try to limit the rights of 
EU citizens to work and live here? 
—  Answers from 1 ‘should try to limit rights’ to 10 ‘should not try to limit rights’.
FIGURE 12 Policy priorities for the EU in coming years by globalization fears in five countries
What tasks should the EU focus on in the coming years? Most important in percent.
Fight Terrorism Protect Citizen Rights Create Growth Fight Inequality Other
   Manage Migration Secure Peace Stop Climate Change Fix Eurozone 
France
Globalization as an opportunity 
24 21 19 11 6 7 5 5
25 20 19 13 6 5 6 5
Globalization as a threat
Germany
Globalization as an opportunity 
24 22 16 13 7 6 5 5
22 18 20 14 9 7 5
Globalization as a threat
Italy
Globalization as an opportunity 
28 20 15 15 4 8 4
27 19 17 11 8 5 6 6
Globalization as a threat
Poland
Globalization as an opportunity 
24 18 17 17 5 7 4 7
29 18 14 14 5 7 6 5
Globalization as a threat
Spain
Globalization as an opportunity 
25 21 16 14 6 7 7
22 23 17 14 6 8 6
Globalization as a threat
3
33
3
3
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• To what extent do you think [your country] should help in establishing an Euro-
pean army? 
— Answers from 1 ‘should not help’ to 10 ‘should help’.
Table 2 provides an EU27 overview of views. The second column summarizes 
the views of the average EU27 respondent, while the third and fourth columns 
divides views on European cooperation between those who view globalization 
as a threat and those who view it as an opportunity. Higher answer categories 
reflect more support for European cooperation. Overall, people’s support for it 
is mildly positive. Respondents overall wish their country to contribute slightly 
more to EU policy initiatives in future. Although such support is not overwhelming, 
responses are close to 6 on a rising scale from 1 to 10. The least popular area 
of European cooperation is providing financial assistance to struggling member 
states at 5.3, while the most popular is the protection of EU migrant rights at 
5.9 – though these differences in support are slight. Respondents who view 
globalization as an opportunity are more positively disposed towards European 
cooperation than the average EU27 citizen, while those who view it as a threat 
are on average more skeptical. 
 
TABLE 2 Preferences for more European cooperation by globalization fears in EU27
On a scale from 1–10, my country should: 
EU27 Globalization as  
a threat
Globalization as 
an opportunity
Accept EU migrants 5.9 5.4 6.4
Help to establish  
European army
5.8 5.2 6.2
Accept refugees in line 
with EU quotas
5.6 4.8 6.2
Provide financial  
assistance to struggling 
EU countries
5.3 4.6 5.7
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Interestingly, both those who view globalization as an opportunity and/or a 
threat think that their country should respect the rights of EU member states 
to work and live in their country (6.4 and 5.4 respectively). Yet, while those who 
view globalization positively think their country should respect the rights of both 
EU migrants and refugees, pessimists about globalization are wary of accepting 
refugees in accordance with EU quotas (6.2 versus 4.8 respectively). Differences 
between those who fear globalization versus those who do not can also be found 
in views about establishing a European army. Those who think that globalization 
is an opportunity are of the view that their country should help more compared 
to those who fear globalization (6.2 versus 5.2). The final interesting thing to 
note in Table 2 is that support for financial assistance of a struggling member 
state finds the least support of all aspects of European cooperation regardless 
of respondents’ views about globalization (4.6 for those who see globalization 
as a threat and 5.7 for those who view it as an opportunity). 
Figure 14 presents the same information as Table 2, but now divides it by 
the five largest EU27 member states. Although we find differences in the extent 
of support for European cooperation across countries, the pattern found in Table 
2 based on globalization fears persists. The figure shows that overall those who 
fear globalization are least supportive of their country cooperating at the EU level, 
while those for whom it constitutes an opportunity wish to see more joint action. 
Yet, the aspects of European cooperation that are least supported by those who fear 
globalization vary per country. In Poland refugee support is least popular among 
these, in Spain it is contributing to a European army, while in France, Germany 
and Italy providing financial support for struggling member states seems to be 
the biggest stumbling block. Among optoimists about globalization, support for 
a European army is most popular in France, Italy and Poland, while in Spain it is 
support for the rights of EU migrants and in Germany the acceptance of refugees.
absolute supportno support
France
Germany
Italy
Poland
Spain
France
Germany
Italy
Poland
Spain
France
Germany
Italy
Poland
Spain
France
Germany
Italy
Poland
Spain
0 5 10
Globalisation as a threat
Globalisation as an opportunity /
/
/
/
/
/
Accept EU Migrants
Contribute to European Army
Accept Refugees
Provide Financial Aid
FIGURE 14 Support for European cooperation by globalization fears in five EU member states
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Figures 15.1–15.5 (the graphs can be found at www.eupinions.eu/data) displays 
the support for European cooperation across different groups of party supporters 
in the five largest countries. The first thing to note is that among supporters 
of the populist right, European cooperation is eyed very skeptically, especially 
when it concerns providing financial assistance to struggling member states or 
the acceptance of refugees in line with EU quota. For example, supporters of the 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), National Front (FN), Forza D’Italia (FI), Lega 
Nord (LN) and/or Law and Justice (PiS) all provide a score below 5. Interestingly, 
the protection of the rights of EU migrants commands greater support among 
populist right-wing party supporters. In fact, only those of the National Front 
(FN) in France and Forza D’Italia (FI) in Italy give it a score below 5. Among 
populist left-wing party supporters, those of the Left party in Germany (Linke) 
or Podemos (Podemos) in Spain are quite skeptical of more military cooperation. 
While security concerns should be high on the EU’s agenda according to them, 
the establishment of an European army is not perceived as the way forward 
to dealing with such concerns. Interestingly, support for helping to set up a 
European army is highest among party supporters in Poland. Party supporters 
of the German Left Party (Linke) and Spanish Podemos (Podemos) are also 
less positive about providing financial aid. Providing financial aid to member 
states in need is also least popular among mainstream party supporters, who 
are otherwise quite keen on more European cooperation in future. 
The results in this section suggest that clear differences in people’s support 
for cooperation exist among those who fear globalization versus those who do 
not. We also find differences between those who support mainstream parties 
and those who support populist parties, especially on the right. Cooperation at 
the EU level in concert with other member states is least popular among those 
who view globalization as a threat and support populist parties on the right. 
These respondents have overall little faith in European cooperation. Supporters 
of populist left-wing parties, however, do favor more European cooperation 
in future even though they share the same skepticism towards globalization 
as populist right-wing supporters. In fact, supporters of the populist left are 
often more supportive of European cooperation than the average European 
citizen. The clear exception to this is the creation of a European army that 
finds little backing. 
When it comes to EU policy priorities in years to come we find fewer dif-
ferences between the opinions of those who fear globalization and those who 
do not, or between populist and mainstream party supporters. Most respond-
ents view the fight against terrorism and the management of migration as the 
key tasks ahead. Interestingly, economic policy focused on creating growth, 
fighting inequality or fixing the Eurozone are not perceived as top policy 
priorities. These results suggest that although differences between those who 
fear globalization and those who do not and between supporters of populist 
and mainstream parties exist, these groups share some political views. They 
want the EU to help in the fight against terrorism and to help provide security. 
Although they differ on how much European cooperation they think is pref-
erable, this is primarily due to the dissenting views of supporters of populist 
right-wing parties rather than on supporters of the populist left. That said, 
supporters of populist right-wing parties do share some views held by other 
groups. Especially when it comes to what the policy priorities of the EU should 
be in years to come: the fight against terrorism, management of migration and 
protection of citizens’ rights.
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These policy priorities could provide useful starting points for policy makers. 
It would allow them to focus on the issues that bind rather than divide Europeans. 
Finding ways to deal with these challenges will be difficult and different groups 
might disagree about how best to tackle them, but they are now the most salient 
for almost every European citizen.  
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 Concluding Remarks
The data summarized in this report conveys five keys messages about people’s 
fears and preferences for international cooperation in Europe. 
1. Europeans are split when it comes to their views about globalization. 
While significant numbers view globalization as a threat, when asked 
about their personal experiences with it they are on average positive. The 
pattern among supporters of populist parties is different. They report be-
ing both fearful of globalization and asserting that they have been badly 
affected personally.
2. When it comes to the meanings that Europeans attach to the globalization 
process, we find many commonalities. The majority associates globaliza-
tion with trade (increased movement of products and money) and migra-
tion (increased movement of people).
3. We do not find a clear-cut relationship between people’s views about glo-
balization and European cooperation. While optimists about globalization 
also welcome more European integration, those who fear it hold widely 
different views. Some of them support further integration. Some of them 
reject it. 
4. There seems to be an important difference between those who support 
populist left- and populist right-wing parties. While both sets think 
globalization is a threat, populist left supporters want more European 
cooperation and populist right ones do not. 
5. Despite these important differences, we find that the majority of Eu-
ropeans do agree on two key issues: they want the EU to focus its fu-
ture efforts both on the fight against terrorism and the management of 
migration. 
What do these results mean for policy makers? In public discourse, globalization 
is often discussed in a variety of ways, for example as facilitating the rise of 
greedy bankers, migrants who abuse social services, or robots that make factory 
jobs obsolete. But also as producing cheap and convenient consumer goods and 
services. Our findings indicate that ordinary Europeans think of globalization in 
terms of increased movement of products and money (trade) and people (mi-
gration). This makes globalization hit home as the European integration process 
is keenly associated with the single market for goods and services and the free 
movement of people. Yet, people’s views about trade and levels of migration 
do not automatically translate into people’s preferences for future European 
cooperation, especially among populist left party supporters. While much of 
the current discourse is directed by outward-looking people who embrace glo-
balization and European integration and by those holding more parochial views 
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that reject globalization and European integration, we have identified a third 
group: those who fear globalization but see the EU as a solution to the problem. 
This group supports populist left-wing parties and wishes to see more European 
cooperation, especially when it comes to financial assistance for struggling mem-
ber states and acceptance of EU migrants, compared to the average European. 
These results suggest that while there is a small segment of the population that 
fears all forms of international cooperation and are more likely to support the 
populist right, the majority thinks that the EU could provide a vehicle to deal 
with problems associated with globalization. The findings might provide EU and 
national officials with ample impetus to shape the future of the EU post-Brexit.
Moreover, our results show that there is somewhat of a disconnect between 
people’s personal experiences with globalization and their perceived fears. While 
they report to have had more good than bad personal experiences, they do 
seem to fear what the process might bring in future. It seems fair to say that 
addressing these fears constitutes the key challenge for mainstream parties of 
left and right in decades to come. Only by doing so can voters be “won back” 
from their populist challengers. 
Political leaders and parties all over Europe seem to be realizing the need to 
adapt. Rightly so. Our figures show once more that considerable numbers feel 
insecure about their ability to cope with the future. They feel threatened by how 
the world is evolving and what this evolution will mean for them and – more 
importantly – for their children. These fears are not necessarily economic in 
nature, according to our data, but touch upon security, migration and the pro-
tection of citizens’ rights. They also touch upon status issues and worries about 
losing one’s place in the world. The relation between place and space, between 
stability and change, seems to be out of kilter for significant numbers of people. 
Restoring confidence might be a promising answer to the general feeling 
that made “take back control” a success. “Give back confidence” rather than 
“take back control”. It goes without saying that political action cannot hope to 
control the entire future. However, a smart policy mix can certainly increase 
people’s confidence in their ability to deal with uncertainty and foster societal 
resilience. This is a task for political leaders with a love of the long haul. 
Left-wing politicans and thinkers may be well-advised to note that economic 
and inequality issues rank at the bottom of people’s priorities at the moment. 
Even those who fear globalization define it in economic terms but still put se-
curity and migration on the top of their to-do list.
Right-wing politicans and thinkers on the other hand would be ill-advised to 
assume that the wish to “feel safe” translates into the will to “seclude oneself”. 
64 percent of these who embrace globalization as well as 45 per cent of those 
who fear it support integrated policy solutions at EU level. So far, we have not 
been able to produce any evidence for the notion that “people generally see the 
nation state as a safe haven”.
Successful measures cannot exclusively be based on securing economic 
growth or reducing immigration and this means that right-wing as well as left-
wing politicians should be wary of their analytical reflexes. And they cannot be 
exclusively short term-ist. So they have to be wary of their political reflexes as 
well. Making people feel safe in an increasingly interconnected world will require 
new thinking on both sides of the political spectrum. 
26
E U P I N I O N S  GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?
Alexander van der Bellen and Emmanuel Macron have brought proof that 
political campaigns can be won with a straightforward, openly pro-European 
liberal and inclusive worldview. In our European societies, there clearly is a de-
sire for a sense of direction that can be put into words. But action must indeed 
follow. In its early days, the European Union and its political leaders did a great 
job in liberating and connecting people, member states, markets. Now it needs 
to prove that it can not just enable but also protect.
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Method 
T his report presents an overview of a study conducted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung in July 2017 on public opinion across 28 EU Member States. The sample of n=10.755 was drawn across all 28 EU Member States, taking into account current population distributions with regard to age (14-65 
years), gender and region/country. In order to obtain census representative results, 
the data were weighted based upon the most recent Eurostat statistics. The target 
weighting variables were age, gender, level of education (as defined by ISCED 
(2011) levels 0-2, 3-4, and 5-8), and degree of urbanization (rural and urban). 
An iterative algorithm was used to identify the optimal combination of weighting 
variables based on sample composition within each country. An estimation of 
the overall design effect based on the distribution of weights was calculated at 
1.46 at the global level. Calculated for a sample of this size and considering the 
design-effect, the margin of error would be +/-1.1 % at a confidence level of 95 %.
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